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Summary
This article emphasizes the more-than-human nature of foreign policy formation and 
diplomatic practice, as found in an examination of nineteenth-century Parliament 
Select Committee testimony regarding the intersection of everyday bureaucratic prac-
tice and the material context of the British Foreign Office. These records indicate both 
how the changing world of diplomacy at this time (including new states and commu-
nication technologies) materially impacted the Foreign Office, as well as the affective 
atmosphere experienced by its employees, through an excess of paper. Debates over 
how the new Foreign Office ought to be built reveal concerns about the circulation of 
paper, bodies, light and air in a drive for efficiency. These historical materialities speak 
to our understanding of contemporary changes occurring within the world of diplo-
macy, including the rise of digital technologies and the new skills needed among diplo-
mats, as well as inform our understanding of the exercise of power within assemblages.
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 Introduction
Mostly enthusiasts of Victorian design know the tale of the Whitehall building 
that currently houses the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
which was completed in 1874.1 However, the process of replacing the former 
office is of interest to scholars of diplomacy, as it enables us to consider the 
constitution of the foreign ministry as a bureaucracy within a larger diplo-
matic system, and the role of the non-human in that dispositif or apparatus.
State theorists have in the past identified the 1782 creation of Britain’s 
Foreign Office as a foundational moment for foreign policy as an object of 
government.2 Prior to 1782, two secretaries of state divided the sovereign’s busi-
ness, not according to a domestic/foreign binary, but rather by a north/south 
binary that cut across borders: the Northern Department dealt with northern 
Europe and the northern parts of the realm; while the Southern Department 
dealt with Ireland, the Americas and the Mediterranean, as well as southern 
England. In some ways, the pre-1782 arrangement reflected the limited inten-
sity of diplomatic exchange and the aristocratic nature of European diplo-
macy; it was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the British government 
considered building a grand dining hall, the London corps diplomatique having 
finally outgrown the dining facilities available to an average aristocrat/foreign 
secretary. 
In the late eighteenth century, Britain’s defeat in the American Revolu-
tionary War contributed to a mood of reorganization, amplified by the mate-
rial requirements of a rapidly developing administrative apparatus. The 
Foreign Office, with only nine clerks and three servants, was located in 1782 on 
Cleveland Row adjacent to St James’s Palace, but four years later it was moved 
to Whitehall Palace, and then seven years after that it transferred to Downing 
Street. These moves coincided with the ‘new “total” commitment of the coun-
try to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 1793-1815, [which] enor-
mously increased the number of staff required to run such large-scale military 
operations’.3 There, in improvised accommodation next to the more famous 10 
Downing Street, the Foreign Office would remain for decades, part of the nerve 
1    Keith Hamilton, ‘Accommodating Diplomacy: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
the Debate over Whitehall Redevelopment’, Contemporary British History, vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), 
pp. 198-222. See also Bernard Porter, The Battle of the Styles: Society, Culture, and the Design of 
a New Foreign Office, 1855-1861 (London: A&C Black, 2011).
2    Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
3    Anthony Seldon, The Foreign Office: An Illustrated History of the Place and Its People (London: 
HarperCollins, 2000), p. 39.
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centre of the British state. These developments might seem mundane, even 
boring — a series of address changes for a small group of clerks. Alternatively, 
they indicate how the Foreign Office must be actualized in particular material 
contexts, which are themselves crucial to the workings of foreign policy forma-
tion and the broader project of governmentality. 
The empirical objective of this article is to trace the Foreign Office’s subse-
quent improvisation, not only in terms of office space but in a rapidly changing 
diplomatic system. As the article will demonstrate, the Downing Street Foreign 
Office was a suitable site at the beginning of its tenure, but changes in the dip-
lomatic system soon highlighted the building’s lack of resilience. The lifespan 
and the affective atmosphere of the building were materially impacted by the 
rapid growth and intensification of the diplomatic system in which the build-
ing was enmeshed. Given the massive expenditure on a new Foreign Office 
and the length of time it was therefore expected to serve its purpose, it was 
necessary to extrapolate what the future diplomatic system would look like 
and how it would work, so that the new building would enable an efficient 
public service over time. 
Conceptually, this article’s objective is to address the affective forces that 
reshape foreign policy apparatuses as a result of their participation in the 
larger diplomatic system. Processes unfolding elsewhere have effects that 
ripple through the Foreign Office, and they are borne via the materials of 
diplomacy. A concern with institutional efficiency and resilience thus emerges 
during times of rapid change. Nevertheless, because social processes often 
unfold over different temporalities (for example, the long lifespan of a building 
versus rapid changes in telecommunications) these attempts to ‘future-proof’ 
the institution may have unintended outcomes.
This article proceeds in several parts. First, the literature on the more-than-
human is reviewed, with an eye towards a theoretical elaboration of diplomacy 
as the discursive and affective tendons for a global assemblage of state bureau-
cracies, marked by a relational ontology and uneven intensities of connection 
among its constituent parts. This review’s focus on how non-human elements 
of the diplomatic apparatus both enable and exceed the traditional anthropo-
centric remit of diplomatic studies sets up the empirical analysis of the article. 
After a discussion of methods, the article examines everyday routines of the 
early- to mid-nineteenth century Foreign Office, with a particular emphasis 
on the role of paper. Paper is not only the archive that enables transnational 
governmentality, but is also an unruly element of the diplomatic apparatus, 
whose materiality posed problems for the Foreign Office, literally shaking it 
to its foundations. This section speaks to the article’s conceptual objectives, 
by demonstrating the role of materials as vectors for affect within diplomatic 
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systems, which can remake foreign policy apparatuses. The article then con-
siders contemporary debates over how to produce affective atmospheres that 
are conducive to efficient governmentality in the new Foreign Office. This sec-
tion speaks to the conceptual objectives by emphasizing human efforts to gov-
ern the circulation of materials and to design a building that was resilient to 
changes in the wider diplomatic system. The paper concludes by examining 
the implications of this scholarship for studies of governmentality, diplomacy 
and assemblage.
 More-than-Human Diplomacy
Diplomacy has traditionally been considered a human endeavour, which 
is unsurprising given its usual definition as the practice of diplomats. As an 
example that is particularly relevant to this study, T.G. Otte’s study, The Foreign 
Office Mind, examined the collective mind-set of those working in the nine-
teenth-century Foreign Office: their social exclusivity; their public school edu-
cation; and so on.4 Such an approach is useful, but — as the name of Otte’s 
book hints — it emphasizes rationality and human agency. Indeed, the Foreign 
Office moved into its new building in 1868, but this event is never mentioned, 
as there is no place for materiality in Otte’s account. Otte is, of course, not 
alone; indeed, the myriad outstanding insights of the ‘Practice Turn’ within 
diplomatic studies have re-emphasized the importance of humans.5 
The role of humans in politics, however, has been decentred by the so-called 
‘New Materialisms’.6 This work highlights the role of materials in not only co-
producing human agency (for example, as tools), but also in shaping political 
subjectivities. Hence, these authors argue that we should consider politics to 
be a more-than-human affair — that is, humans exercising agency are not sta-
ble entities, but are themselves shaped by a range of materialities that change 
over time.7 This perspective does not seek to ignore humans and their agency; 
4    T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
5    Iver Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2012); and Merje Kuus, ‘Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical 
Intervention’, Geopolitics, vol. 18, no. 1 (2012), pp. 115-131.
6    As an example, see Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
7    Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore, Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy and Public 
Life (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); William Connolly, ‘The “New 
Materialism” and the Fragility of Things’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 41, 
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indeed, human agency is special because of humans’ ability to be reflexive 
and intentional. Rather, scholars working within the ‘New Materialism’ situate 
human agency within the material context that produced it. As Merje Kuus 
notes, ‘[t]o study context is not to trace cause in the sense of predicting specific 
events, but to expose and explicate these events’ conditions of possibility’.8 
From this perspective, the capabilities enabled by the old and new Foreign 
Office buildings, and other infrastructures of diplomacy, from the telegraph to 
Twitter, are crucial to the workings of diplomats, and therefore we can begin to 
speak of a more-than-human diplomacy.
A more-than-human diplomacy is helpfully considered through the lens of 
assemblage theory.9 Andrew Barry has argued that ‘instead of drawing a line 
between the social and technical, one must instead analyse arrangements: of 
artefacts, practices and techniques, instruments, language and bodies. These 
arrangements make up what we tend to think of as persons and institutions: 
states, markets, families, and so on’.10 These arrangements emerge out of pro-
cesses such as territorialization (in which the coherence of the assemblage 
is enhanced) or coding (in which meaning is ascribed to the assemblage). 
Assemblages are becoming, both because they are open systems into which 
new elements can enter or from which old elements can leave, and also 
because elements can participate in multiple assemblages at once, allowing 
events in one assemblage to affect another. Indeed, elements of an assemblage 
can also be assemblages themselves, engaged in their own processes of becom-
ing. This troubles the usual scalar imagination of diplomacy and international 
relations, in which bigger entities are assumed to be more important. Rather, 
assemblage theory emphasizes non-linear causality, in which small events can 
  no. 3 (2013), pp. 399-412; Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, Post-human Inter national 
Relations: Complexity, Ecologism and Global Politics (London: Zed Books, 2011); Jason 
Dittmer, ‘Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity’, Progress in Human Geography, vol. 
38, no. 3 (2014), pp. 385-401; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to 
Actor–Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Tom Lundborg and Nick 
Vaughn-Williams, ‘New Materialisms, Discourse Analysis, and International Relations: A 
Radical Intertextual Approach’, Review of International Studies (early online); and Vicki 
Squire, ‘Reshaping Critical Geopolitics? The Materialist Challenge’, Review of International 
Studies, vol. 41, no. 1 (2015), pp. 139-159.
8     Merje Kuus, ‘Bureaucracy and Place: Expertise in the European Quarter’, Global Networks, 
vol. 11, no. 4 (2011), p. 424.
9     Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane, ‘Assemblage and Geography’, Area, vol. 43, no. 2 
(2011), p. 124.
10    Andrew Barry, Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society (London: Continuum, 
2001), p. 11.
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ripple through assemblages, producing macro-scaled effects. Assemblage the-
ory therefore enables us to consider a more-than-human diplomacy as one in 
which: 1) the scalar imagination of international relations is flattened in favour 
of a relational ontology; and 2) the role of materials in shaping political subjec-
tivity and action is brought to the foreground.
These two insights mean that a more-than-human diplomacy can direct our 
attention to aspects that have thus far been under-examined. The relatively flat 
ontology of assemblage emphasizes everyday diplomatic practices and objects 
in the crafting of the state.11 This dovetails with Timothy Mitchell’s much-cited 
description of the state as the tangible effect of everyday bodily performances.12 
By considering state effects rather than states per se,13 we can both consider 
a range of diplomatic actors that may not qualify as states and also see the 
(il)legitimacy of states as the emergent outcome of practices occurring across 
a range of sites, from the local tax office to the United Nations.14 These prac-
tices of statecraft are open-ended and often improvised, as actors seek to pro-
mote their own state visions.15 However, the second point above — about the 
role of materials in political life — means that diplomatic practices entail the 
coming together of the human and non-human in particular ways, which in 
the best of circumstances requires work and often fails to occur. This is evi-
dent in, for example, the importance of gifts to diplomatic encounters.16 Iver 
Neumann’s account of the diplomatic party is a case in point: preparation for 
11    For example, Alex Jeffrey and Michaelina Jakala, ‘The Hybrid Legal Geographies of a War 
Crimes Court’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 104, no. 3 (2014), 
pp. 652-667.
12    Timothy Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics’, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 1 (1991), pp. 77-96.
13    Joe Painter, ‘Prosaic Geographies of Stateness’, Political Geography, vol. 25, no. 7 (2006), 
pp. 752-774.
14    Fiona McConnell, ‘De Facto, Displaced, Tacit: The Sovereign Articulations of the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile’, Political Geography, vol. 28, no. 6 (2009), pp. 343-352; 
and Fiona McConnell, Terri Moreau and Jason Dittmer, ‘Mimicking State Diplomacy: 
The Legitimizing Strategies of Unofficial Diplomacies’, Geoforum, vol. 43, no. 4 (2012), 
pp. 804-814.
15    Alex Jeffrey, The Improvised State: Sovereignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton Bosnia 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
16    Christine Kreamer and Sarah Fee (eds), Objects as Envoys: Cloth, Imagery and Diplomacy 
in Madagascar (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002); Samson Opondo, 
‘Diplomatic Dissensus: A Report on Humanitarianism, Moral Community and the Space 
of Death’, in Samson Opondo and Michael Shapiro (eds), The New Violent Cartography 
(London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 95-117.
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state visits begins six months out, and appropriate foods are sourced.17 Seating 
placards are arranged such that the diplomats’ bodies might also be arranged. 
When one Italian ambassador ‘found out he had been wrongly placed among 
the NATO delegation, [. . . h]e stood up, broke his plate in two, and left the 
building’.18 Diplomacy, like a dinner plate, is a fragile thing. We must under-
stand diplomatic power as emerging from particular material contexts in 
which the human and non-human enable one another.
However, the flat ontology of assemblage means that we do not have to 
stop with the state; rather, the entire diplomatic system can be understood 
as an assemblage, from which a transnational governmentality emerges. 
Governmentality is a complex concept that is perhaps best summarized with 
the pithy description ‘the conduct of conduct’.19 Most historians see the rise of 
governmentality and diplomacy as intertwined, in that the diplomatic assem-
blage shaped modern subjects enrolled in it: ‘Foreign countries helped to shape 
states, since they served for the production of their most important material: 
servants who were able to convincingly feign complete ignorance and absolute 
loyalty’.20 These new subjects were unique in their specific national loyalties, 
and yet similar in that they were territorialized to the state. 
However, just as elements can participate in multiple assemblages simulta-
neously, diplomats’ loyalties could be multiple: ‘Early–modern diplomacy was 
characterized by both the “plurality” of roles adopted by diplomatic interme-
diaries and the variety of services they undertook not only for their Princes 
but also for the other cultural, religious, or social communities to which they 
belonged’.21 The diplomatic system was therefore composed through states, 
but not reducible to them. By de-privileging the scale of the state, it becomes 
possible to see multiple scales emerging simultaneously through the pro-
cesses of diplomatic assemblage. For example, Stuart Elden traces the simul-
taneous emergence of both the modern territorial state and of Europe as a 
17    Iver Neumann, Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 2012).
18    Neumann, Diplomatic Sites, p. 63.
19    Tania Murray Li, ‘Governmentality’, Anthropologica, vol. 49, no. 2 (2007), pp. 275-281.
20    Christian Wieland, ‘The Consequences of Early Modern Diplomacy: Entanglement, 
Discrimination, Mutual Ignorance — and State Building’, in Antje Fletcher and Susan 
Richter (eds), Structures on the Move: Technologies of Governance in Transcultural 
Encounters (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2012), p. 271.
21    Noe Cornago, Plural Diplomacies: Normative Predicaments and Functional Imperatives 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 40-41.
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diplomatico-military dispositif [or apparatus22] through the negotiation of the 
Treaties of Westphalia:
War is intended to be used judiciously, with a clear sense of why it is 
being fought, and used strategically to reinforce the balance of power. 
Diplomacy is to become an instrument or tool, with the negotiations in 
Westphalia as a model, with a congress of all states involved, and with a 
system of permanent ambassadors. Europe is seen as a juridico-political 
entity in itself, with a system of diplomatic and political security; but this 
is underpinned by the third instrument, each state having a permanent 
military apparatus of professional soldiers with an infrastructure of for-
tresses and transport, and sustained tactical reflection.23
The idea of states’ diplomacy as both a justification for ‘internal’ governmen-
tality (that is, the maximization of domestic populations and other resources 
as being necessary for the raison d’état) and as a technique of ‘external’ projects 
of governmentality (such as maintaining the balance of power in Europe, or 
producing a neo-liberal global economy) illustrates the duality that is inher-
ent to diplomacy. Diplomatic practices are of the state and yet also more: they 
serve as the material tendons of a larger assemblage, one which reshapes the 
subjectivities of those composing it:
The one-sided diplomat acquires legitimacy from ‘inside’ a political 
unit — from the ‘national’ or the ‘communal’ — and uses his or her craft 
to support representations and actions mostly directed to the ‘outside’ or 
‘non-national’. The mid-space diplomat acquires legitimacy from the inter-
stitial — from the international or intercommunal — making the most 
of not taking sides or by functionally distancing oneself from the sides; 
in other words, uses one’s craft to support actions that re-engage and 
re-position the ‘sides’.24
Assemblage theory therefore dovetails with the notion of diplomacy as some-
thing that is more than the enactment of states’ foreign policies. Rather, the 
22    See Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009).
23    Stuart Elden, ‘Governmentality, Calculation, Territory’, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, vol. 25, no. 3 (2007), p. 572.
24    Costas Constantinou, ‘Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and its Forms of 
Knowledge’, International Studies Review, vol. 15, no. 2 (2013), p. 145.
86 Dittmer
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (2016) 78-104
diplomatic system is a constantly-changing assemblage of diplomats, secure 
email systems, buildings, state dinners and so on, coming together in ways 
that continually remake the state, as well as various extra-territorial projects 
of governmentality.25 New elements of this assemblage can ripple through the 
system in ways that are unpredictable in advance, reworking political cogni-
tion of both individual diplomats and of entire state assemblages. This article 
traces both the ways in which the intensifying flows of material within the 
diplomatic system interacted with the physical context of the Foreign Office 
in unexpected ways, and how the British government subsequently attempted 
to ‘future-proof’ the Foreign Office through spatial design that might regulate 
those flows.
 Methods
Researching life within a secretive organization 150 years ago is challenging.26 
Without ethnographic or other contemporaneous qualitative methods 
favoured by researchers in political anthropology and cognate fields, a 
researcher must turn to the archives, and, as Martin Müller argues, ‘documents, 
no matter how detailed or vivid, always already contain a pre-selection of the 
association that their authors considered noteworthy’.27 For example, ‘[W]hen 
the State Papers were compiled at the Public Records Office during the nine-
teenth century, the correspondence [. . .] was edited so that things which did 
not strike the compilers as relevant to what they held to be foreign policy [. . .] 
were left out’.28
This occlusion of documents that were not directly related to foreign pol-
icy from the FCO archive means that this research is largely based on three 
Parliamentary Select Committee reports: the 1839 Select Committee on Public 
25    Thomas Lemke, ‘New Materialisms: Foucault and the “Government of Things” ’, Theory, 
Culture, and Society, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 3-25.
26    Jim Duncan, ‘Complicity and Resistance in the Colonial Archive: Some Issues of Method 
and Theory in Historical Geography’, Historical Geography, vol. 27 (1999), pp. 119-128.
27    Martin Müller, ‘Opening the Black Box of the Organization: Socio-material Practices of 
Geopolitical Ordering’, Political Geography, vol. 31, no. 6 (2012), p. 383; see also Matthew 
Kurtz, ‘Situating Practices: The Archive and the Filing Cabinet’, Historical Geography, vol. 
29 (2001), pp. 26-37; and Miles Ogborn, ‘Knowledge is Power: Using Archival Research to 
Interpret State Formation’, in Alison Blunt, Pyrs Gruffudd, Jon May, Miles Ogborn and 
David Pinder (eds), Cultural Geography in Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 9-22.
28    Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats, p. 44.
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Offices (Downing Street); the 1855 Select Committee on Downing Street 
Public Offices Extension Bill; and the 1858 Select Committee on Foreign Office 
Reconstruction, supplemented by diplomatic memoirs and secondary litera-
ture. Where Foreign Office records had been tailored to exclude the everyday 
routines and materialities of the FCO, Parliamentary records were helpful, 
because in their discussions over the housing of the Foreign Office, the every-
day practices and materialities of the Foreign Office intersected with the pub-
lic purse. Foreign Office staff, architects, engineers and other witnesses to the 
role of materiality in the Foreign Office spoke before the committees. 
It would, of course, be a mistake to take these accounts at face value. First, 
the imbrications of the human and non-human are often so mundane as to be 
beneath notice;29 some would argue that when the assemblage is ‘working’, 
this is even the desired outcome.30 Therefore, the accounts brought before the 
Select Committees were incomplete. Furthermore, the context is highly rel-
evant; this was an opportunity for bureaucratic advancement vis-à-vis other 
departments. Still, the testimony’s depth makes it possible to tease out these 
weaknesses and to account for them, providing a partial, although meaning-
ful, engagement with the more-than-human diplomacy of the mid-nineteenth 
century Foreign Office.
This study is not the first to use historical documents in ‘New Materialist’—
oriented research.31 Rather than imagining the researcher as occupying a 
privileged position from which truth can be liberated from the archive, Nick 
Fox and Pam Alldred imagine research as an assemblage of researcher/docu-
ments/interviewees, etc.:
If [. . .] we see researcher and data (along with many other relations) as 
a ‘research assemblage’ [. . .] with its own affect economy, we begin to 
recognize research as a territorialization that shapes the knowledge it 
produces according to the particular flows of affect produced by its meth-
odology and methods.32
29    Tim Edensor, ‘Illuminated Atmospheres: Anticipating and Reproducing the Flow of 
Affective Experience in Blackpool’, Environment and Planning D: Society & Space, vol. 30, 
no. 6 (2012), pp. 1103-1122.
30    Latour, Reassembling the Social
31    Miguel Pina e Cunha, Stewart Clegg and Armenio Rego, ‘The Ethical Speaking of Objects: 
Ethics and the ‘Object-ive’ world of Khmer Rouge Young Comrades’, Journal of Political 
Power, vol. 7, no. 1 (2014), pp. 35-61.
32    Nick Fox and Pam Alldred, ‘New Materialist Social Inquiry: Designs, Methods, and the 
Research Assemblage’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, vol. 18, no. 4, 
p. 403.
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In this formulation, the findings of this research are not so much a subjective 
truth derived from the archive as they are a line of flight emerging from the 
encounter between researcher and archive. Indeed, this article conceptualizes 
the author’s findings as emergent from the ‘research assemblage’. The archive 
itself is a sedimentation of histories, curated to produce a monument to the 
past as possessing certain properties. The archive is, of course, from the past, 
but requires work by others over time to maintain its order. The reports’ inter-
section with the author’s theoretical agenda opened up a latent capacity within 
what would otherwise be an ordinary copy of Hansard (the official record of 
Parliament). This process of assemblage could easily have been otherwise, had 
the reports been classified differently or had the author left early for lunch 
and not discovered them. In short, the becoming of this research itself has a 
‘micro-history’,33 much like the people and buildings that it examines, com-
plete with un-actualized lines of flight and capacities yet undiscovered.
 Disassembling and Reassembling the Foreign Office
A brief overview of events is warranted, given the period of time (roughly 35 
years) over which these select committees met and construction occurred. 
From 1793 onwards, the Foreign Office was based in five houses: 16-18 Downing 
Street (number 15 was later added) and two houses behind those on Fludyer 
Street (a street now disappeared, but previously south of Downing Street). 
These houses were combined through the demolition of internal walls, and 
a new entrance was created by Sir John Soane.34 The rise of Lord Palmerston, 
first as foreign secretary (1830-1834, 1835-1841 and 1846-1851) and then as prime 
minister (1855-1858 and 1859-1865), boded well for the Foreign Office’s desire 
to move out of its run-down, ad-hoc offices. In 1836 the architect Decimus 
Burton was commissioned to design new facilities in Downing Street. The first 
select committee met in 1839 to consider his plans. Despite widespread agree-
ment on the need to build, no decision was made because of an unexpected 
event — the need to rebuild the Houses of Parliament (which had been 
destroyed by fire in 1834).
Still, the Foreign Office’s material deterioration only got worse, and William 
Molesworth, the First Commissioner of Works, called for another set of plans 
to be drawn up, having rejected Burton’s plan as encroaching on St James’s 
33    Simon Naylor, ‘Historical Geography: Geographies and Historiographies’, Progress in 
Human Geography, vol. 32, no. 2 (2008), p. 266.
34    Edward Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office (London: John Murray, 1901).
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Park. James Pennethorne, the government’s official architect, drew up plans 
for a new Foreign Office and presented them to the second select committee 
in 1855. Despite another endorsement by the new committee, Pennethorne’s 
plans languished as well, this time a result of the Crimean War. The Crimean 
War did more than just consume valuable funds; it also highlighted ‘the draw-
backs of having a war directed from so many different buildings in London; 
rationalization became a popular cry, with a unified War Office becoming 
a major justification for a new government building’.35 The diplomatico– 
military dispositif demanded efficiency within the state in order to contribute 
to governmentality above the state. 
By 1855, Palmerston was in 10 Downing Street, looking across the street at 
the dilapidated Foreign Office. He decided on open architectural competitions 
to design a new Foreign Office and War Office, with a third category of com-
petition for the overall design of Whitehall itself. Palmerston’s vague instruc-
tions inspired 218 entries, but produced contradictory winners, with the design 
of each winner clashing with the other, and both clashing with the winner of 
the comprehensive Whitehall design. To settle this, the third select commit-
tee was formed. In the end, George Gilbert Scott was selected to create a pal-
ace of administration, given that he had scored highly in all three categories. 
Subsequently, the War Department was located elsewhere, and the Foreign 
Office shared the new building with the India Office. In November 1861, the 
old Foreign Office in Downing Street was demolished to make way for the new 
building (or buildings, as the two parts of the palace remained distinct), and 
after finding interim quarters in Pembroke House, the Foreign Office moved 
into its new facilities in June 1868. Scott later added two new quadrants to 
the new palace of administration, housing the Home and Colonial Offices 
(see Fig. 1).
Just as the Crimean War had led to a reorganization of the entire British gov-
ernment (albeit over a span of twenty years), the First World War shocked the 
apparatus of British government. The requirements of the diplomatic appara-
tus grew in proportion to the complexity of foreign affairs. After the Second 
World War, the India Office was dissolved because of decolonization, and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office (originally the Dominions Office) absorbed 
the Colonial Office and was itself eventually absorbed into the Foreign Office 
in 1968. In 1978, the Home Office decamped to Queen Anne’s Gate and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was left in sole possession of Scott’s palace 
of administration.
35    Seldon, The Foreign Office, p. 42.
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 Revenge of/on the Paper Pushers: Paper-Power and Diplomacy
This narrative is a traditional, human-centric narrative of bureaucracy, gov-
ernment and international affairs. In what follows, the article will demon-
strate the first conceptual point — on the importance of the non-human to 
diplomacy — by de-emphasizing human agency in favour of a relational 
notion of co-agency, in which not only is human agency enabled through 
relations with materials, but those materials exert themselves on the people 
with whom they work. This is accomplished by re-centring the narrative of the 
Foreign Office on paper.36
The history of writing as part of post-human political regimes has been 
traced from ancient times through the colonial era and into the present, and is 
inextricably linked with diplomacy.37 ‘Etymologically, [. . .] the word is derived 
from the ancient Greek word diploun (to double), and from the Greek noun 
36    See also Jonathan Darling, ‘Another Letter from the Home Office: Reading the Material 
Politics of Asylum’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 32, no. 3 (2014), 
pp. 484-500; and Florian Weisser, ‘Practices, Politics, Performativities: Documents in the 
International Negotiations on Climate Change’, Political Geography, no. 40 (early online).
37    Paul Adams, ‘Networks of Early Writing’, Historical Geography, vol. 38 (2010), pp. 70-89; 
Ogborn, ‘Knowledge is Power’; and Weisser ‘Practices, Politics, Performativities’.
Figure 1 The completed ‘palace of administration’. 
©UCL Creative Media Services
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diploma, which refers to an official document written on double leaves (diploo) 
joined together and folded (diplono).’38 When the Foreign Office was founded, 
paper had long replaced leaves as the surface of inscription for diplomacy. 
Paper’s advantages were manifest. The nineteenth century saw innovations in 
paper manufacturing, enabling cheap wood-based paper to flood the market.39 
This, along with printing press innovations and steam-powered transporta-
tion, enabled a wider circulation of paper and consequently an intensification 
of governmental reach in distant corners of the globe.40 Indeed, the impor-
tance of paper to the Foreign Office was first stated to the select committees by 
James Bandinel in 1839, who argued that access to twenty years’ worth of paper 
was necessary for the daily running of the Foreign Office.41 
However, technological change alone is not enough to explain the changes 
occurring to the Foreign Office at the start of the earlier narrative. Indeed, the 
rise of paper can be traced across all bureaucracies. Rather, what is special here 
is that changes occurring in the diplomatic system resonated with the Office’s 
requirement for paper; the early 1800s saw independence for most of Central 
and South America and therefore a proliferation of geopolitical subjects. 
Foreign Office employee Joseph Planta described the intensity with which the 
office’s work had increased:
When I first knew the office there were not above three or four foreign 
ministers accredited to this country; the number has now increased at 
least to four or five times that amount. Likewise, our relations with for-
eign countries were by no means as considerable as they are now; and 
latterly, in Mr Canning’s time, the whole of South America was thrown 
open too, which almost doubled the business of the foreign office.42
This posed challenges with regard to the number of staff to be housed, but 
more crucially the volume of paper and the way in which it interacted with 
other elements of the Foreign Office assemblage.
38    Costas Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), p. 77.
39    Peter Burger, Charles Fenerty and his Paper Invention (Toronto, ON: Peter Burger, 2007).
40    For an account of the seventeenth and eighteenth century impact of paper and innova-
tions in transportation, see Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the 
English East India Company (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
41    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans (1839).
42    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans, p. 28.
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The select committees all traced the need to build new facilities, rather 
than shore up the Downing Street offices, to this increased circulation of 
paper within the diplomatico-military dispositif. The 1858 select committee 
received evidence of a near-exponential increase in communications coming 
through the Foreign Office — all pre-dating the inclusion of the telegraph in 
the Foreign Office’s links to overseas diplomats (see Table 1 below). This, com-
bined with the need for on-site storage, meant that the paper to be stored in the 
Foreign Office expanded radically year on year. This trend was exacerbated by 
Permanent Under-Secretary Edmund Hammond’s claim in 1858 that the office 
then needed 30 to 50 years’ worth of papers on site43 — although this might, 
of course, have simply been a gambit to obtain more space. Lewis Hertslet, the 
librarian and keeper of the papers in the Foreign Office for 38 years, had this 
exchange with the chair of the 1839 committee:
Chair:  What is the extent of the library you have charge of?
Hertslet:  The library consists of about 5,000 volumes, and the number 
of volumes of manuscripts now in the office is between 4, and 
5,000.
Chair:  How are they placed?
Hertslet:  They are placed in the most irregular and inconvenient man-
ner possible; some of them are stowed away in obscure rooms 
and passages, and there is no semblance of a library.
Chair:  Are they all on the same floor?
Hertslet: No; they are on two floors, or rather on three floors, and these 
are distributed in the four or five houses of which the Foreign 
Office consists.44
Hertslet’s son, who later worked in the Foreign Office, describes the book-
shelves as being ‘three-deep’, complicating any effort at finding a particular 
book.45 If we mention here that the Foreign Office was at this time in no way 
fireproofed, some sense of the tenuous circumstances is achieved.
43    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index (1858).
44    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans, p. 14.
45    Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office.
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Table 1 The increase in despatches received at and sent from the Foreign Office, 1821-1857 
 Political  Consular Slave Trade TOTAL Grand 
 Department Department Department  Total,   
     Received 
     and Sent
year Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent 
1821 4,379 1,630 — — 155 29 4,534 1,659 6,193
1822 3,929 1,390 — — 175 116 4,104 1,506 5,610
1823 4,893 1,909 — — 101 80 4,994 1,989 6,983
1824 5,902 2,747 — — 391 246 6,293 2,993 9,286
1825 5,635 2,740 — — 390 294 6,025 3,034 9,059
1826 5,635 2,522 2,477 973 474 321 8,586 3,816 12,402
1827 4,135 2,002 2,456 966 427 275 7,018 3,243 10,261
1828 4,908 2,471 2,644 1,167 382 259 7,934 3,897 11,831
1829 4,565 2,033 2,274 874 451 563 7,290 3,470 10,760
1830 4,926 2,426 2,421 929 494 350 7,841 3,705 11,546
1831 5,889 2,510 2,949 1,513 409 307 9,247 4,330 13,577
1832 5,279 3,009 2,988 1,644 299 197 8,566 4,850 13,416
1833 5,529 2,815 2,536 1,689 313 260 8,378 4,764 13,142
1834 5,751 3,487 2,624 1,605 427 395 8,802 5,487 14,289
1835 5,487 2,928 2,954 1,664 595 474 9,036 5,066 14,102
1836 6,904 4,268 3,226 2,055 693 472 10,823 6,795 17,618
1837 6,881 4,503 3,449 1,942 745 403 11,075 6,848 17,923
1838 7,511 5,163 3,213 1,584 848 687 11,572 7,434 19,006
1839 7,892 5,535 3,234 1,796 1,128 1,056 12,254 8,387 20,641
1840 8,426 6,032 3,324 2,001 1,257 946 13,007 8,979 21,986
1841 8,922 5,574 4,484 1,813 1,740 1,514 15,146 8,901 24,047
1842 8,192 4,533 5,461 1,882 1,911 1,781 15,564 8,196 23,760
1843 8,363 4,597 5,309 1,784 1,854 1,910 15,526 8,291 23,817
1844 8,615 5,032 5,279 2,136 1,926 1,558 15,820 8,726 24,546
1845 7,989 4,280 5,353 2,310 2,169 2,029 15,511 8,619 24,130
1846 8,951 5,442 5,112 2,257 1,604 1,619 15,667 9,318 24,985
1847 10,755 7,483 5,215 2,415 1,461 1,537 17,431 11,435 28,866
1848 10,565 7,772 5,323 3,030 1,327 1,323 17,215 12,125 29,340
1849 11,705 7,660 5,800 3,081 1,379 1,100 18,884 11,841 30,725
1850 11,358 8,892 5,638 3,071 1,506 1,175 18,502 13,138 31,640
1851 11,511 8,705 6,186 3,914 1,678 1,320 19,375 13,939 33,314
1852 11,902 7,835 6,292 3,734 1,252 1,028 19,446 12,597 32,043
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Paper is here a bulky, combustible problem, but it would be a mistake to con-
sider paper in isolation, a mere by-product of the diplomatic system. ‘The 
political significance of materials is not a given; rather, it is a relational, a prac-
tical and a contingent achievement.’46 In the specific case of the old Foreign 
Office, it was the relations formed among a range of materialities, including 
paper, that posed a particular problem. First, the old Foreign Office was com-
posed of buildings that had been built on alluvial soil, as the Surveyor of Works 
and Buildings, Henry Seward, told the 1839 committee:
I know there was formerly a ditch running along very near the centre of 
that mass of buildings, taking the old front of Sir Samuel Fludyer’s house, 
and, running between the houses in Downing Street and Fludyer Street; 
it was an ancient sewer, therefore the ground on each side of it is bad.47
Indeed, when the neighbouring houses were taken down because of subsid-
ence, it revealed how dependent the Foreign Office had been on them for sup-
port (see Fig. 2).
Second, the paper was entering into assemblage with houses built for pri-
vate use, and so their construction was not intended for such weight. Paper 
individually is light, but the ability to pack a great deal of it in a relatively small 
46    Andrew Barry, Material Politics: Disputes along the Pipeline (Chichester: Wiley, 2013), 
p. 183.
47    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans), pp. 1-2.
1853 13,143 9,120 6,565 3,826 1,344 1,115 21,052 14,061 35,113
1854 17,969 15,661 7,436 5,562 1,269 953 26,674 22,176 48,850
1855 18,855 17,246 9,543 9,571 1,166 938 29,564 27,755 57,319
1856 19,719 17,340 10,427 7,606 1,556 1,266 31,702 26,212 57,914
1857 20,268 19,057 9,979 7,313 1,599 1,307 31,846 27,677 59,523
 Political  Consular Slave Trade TOTAL Grand 
 Department Department Department  Total,   
     Received 
     and Sent
year Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent
Table 1 The increase in despatches received at and sent from the Foreign Office (cont.)
 95Assembling the British Foreign Office
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (2016) 78-104
space causes its weight to accumulate. Thomas Chawner, an architect in the 
Land Revenue, reported to the 1839 committee that papers had been stored in 
the upper stories of the houses, which only made the structure more unstable.48 
Much of the paper was thus moved to the first floor, but this put the clerks 
up high, which made for inefficiency as they frequently ran in and out of the 
building. As paper proliferated into every room, posts were installed in the 
middle of rooms to support the ceiling above. This situation was further com-
plicated by the removal of interior walls to create larger work spaces and the 
creation of openings in walls to facilitate movement within the adjoined 
houses. Seward spoke to his concerns about the former house of Sir Samuel 
Fludyer:49
[T]here has been an alarm about this house in consequence of the altera-
tions made with a view to meeting particular calls for accommodation, 
laying the rooms together, and taking away walls; and it likewise appears 
48    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans).
49    Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office.
Figure 2 The Downing Street Foreign Office being held up by struts.49 
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that the bow front to the west is considerably crushed in the lower part, 
in consequence of the heavy weights which have been thrown upon it.50
There is one more relevant element in the assemblage, and again it is one that 
is particular to the Foreign Office: the printing presses. Just as the paper had 
been held in the higher stories until this hazard was recognized, the printing 
presses had likewise been stored aloft. These printing presses were constantly 
at work, as the Foreign Office not only had its own confidential printing to 
do, but also confidential printing for the entire government. Consequently, at 
the top of these poorly founded, internally unsound and over-freighted houses 
were large, heavy and constantly vibrating machines, and as Thomas Chawner 
testified in 1839: ‘[A]t the time I was there, I found a great quantity of types 
used in printing; these they moved from one place to another, which I consider 
improper; if great weights are shifted from one place to another, it is likely to 
cause settlements’.51 
By the time the 1855 select committee met, the printing presses had been 
moved into the basement. Still, the building retained a materialized memory of 
its previous excesses. Party walls sank into the earth, floors varied by as much 
as a foot across a room, and doors had to be re-hung in order to enable them to 
open. The engineers worked very hard to keep the building from falling down. 
Collectively, then, it can be said that the paper/print assemblage, the soil sub-
stratum and the houses themselves were brought into relation through the 
daily work of the Foreign Office, leading to a set of resonances that rippled 
through the physical structure, leading to safety fears and obvious inefficien-
cies in public work. Lord Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary in 1852 and 1858-1859, 
‘was made perfectly aware of the physical state of his new department in the 
most tangible way when part of the ceiling of his room fell onto his desk’.52 
Another time, a wall adjoining a fireplace crumbled unexpectedly and the fire 
splashed out into the Reference Room, which held innumerable quantities of 
paper. A large fire was only narrowly averted, one that might have destroyed 
the diplomatic archive. In short, paper was not just the archive enabling British 
contributions to the larger diplomatico–military dispositif; it had a material 
form that acted back on the apparatus. 
50    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans), p. 3.
51    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans), pp. 5-6.
52    Seldon, The Foreign Office, p. 41.
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 Governing Affective Atmospheres: Bodies, Air and Light
This section demonstrates the second conceptual point by emphasizing the 
ways in which the government attempted to ‘future-proof’ the new Foreign 
Office building through practices of spatial design that sought to govern mate-
rial circulations.
The process of designing a new Foreign Office became centred on the gov-
ernance of affective atmospheres. These atmospheres emerge in part through 
architectural design, which ‘enables the channelling of affects through con-
figurations of fields that architects and buildings intend to, and sometimes do, 
create’.53 The 1858 select committee met to adjudicate among the various win-
ners of Palmerston’s architectural competition, with reference to the needs of 
the Foreign Office. On the one hand, the myth of the Foreign Office as a black 
box that is distinct from other branches of government was clearly asserted in 
claims by the Permanent Under-Secretary regarding the necessity of a highly 
territorialized Foreign Office with regard to human bodies: the circulation of 
bodies within the Foreign Office ought to be enabled as much as possible, while 
bodies outside the Foreign Office ought to remain so. This required a coding 
of bodies as acceptable or unacceptable. However, this stark territorialization 
belies the perceived need for other elements, such as light and air, to be able to 
enter and permeate the atmosphere of the Foreign Office. As Foucault argues 
in his lecture on apparatuses, ‘it was a matter of organizing circulation, elimi-
nating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circu-
lation, and maximising the good circulation by diminishing the bad’.54
The circulation of bodies is not entirely separate from the issue of paper 
raised earlier. Indeed, the solution offered to the Foreign Office for its paper 
problem was to submit all of its papers, rather than just those beyond the 
twenty year rule, to the State Paper Office, where all the Privy Council’s and 
Secretaries of State’s archives were stored (the Office had been built in 1833 on 
Duke Street just outside St James’s Park, near the Foreign Office). However, this 
was roundly refused by all those who testified in 1839. For instance,
Chair:  Have you occasion to refer often to the papers of a distant 
date?
Hertslet:  I cannot say that we have; but we should more often refer to 
them if they were easier of access [i.e., not in the State Paper 
Office]; for it not infrequently happens that references are 
53    Peter Kraftl and Peter Adey, ‘Architecture/Affect/Inhabitation: Geographies of Being-in 
Buildings’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 98, no. 1 (2008), p. 227.
54    Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (London and New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p. 18.
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required at a late hour of the day — for instance, Parliamentary 
references — that must be reported upon forthwith; there is 
then no time to send to the State Paper Office; and if there 
were, the State Paper Office was probably shut, even before 
the question arose; and we are compelled to do the best we 
can with imperfect materials.55
Here, the territorialization of the Foreign Office is coded through the tempo-
rality of its work; the despatches arrive late, and the State Paper Office was only 
open from 11am until 4pm. 
This territorialization becomes clearer when the debate turns to the circula-
tion of bodies. An explicit aim of Permanent Under-Secretary Hammond was 
maintaining a boundary between the inside and outside of the Office. When 
discussing the possible shape of the palace of administration, Hammond had 
the following exchange with the committee:
Chair:  You would have your office self-contained?
Hammond:  Certainly. Our office is quite large enough for any one set of 
servants to manage; and especially as regards office hours; 
our system in the office is so thoroughly different from that 
of every other office, as far as I am acquainted with other 
offices, that we never could combine our arrangements 
with those of another office.
Chair:  Then you would not like even a door into the Colonial or 
any other office?
Hammond: No. I should, in the first place, particularly dislike the facility 
of communication between the clerks of different offices, 
from the circumstance, among other reasons, that our real 
business hours, that is hours of pressure, commence when 
other offices are rising, and it is a very natural thing for 
acquaintances from one office to come into the other office 
just at what would be to us the most inconvenient time. In 
fact, I would much rather have as few visitors in the office, 
and as little encouragement to visitors, as there could pos-
sibly be.56
55    Report from Select Committee on Public Offices (Downing Street) with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Plans), p. 14.
56    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 5.
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This policing of the Foreign Office notably foreshadows later concerns over 
secrecy and the imposition of a strict visual regime within the diplomatico–
military dispositif,57 but does so with a concern for atmospheres of efficiency, 
which in turn can create the conditions for a more effective governmentality.
If Hammond had a strong desire to police the boundaries of the Foreign 
Office to produce an atmosphere of efficiency, he also wanted an internal 
space that facilitated movement. The old Foreign Office was notable for its 
clutter and poor organization. Hertslet describes, for example, that the librar-
ian’s office was on the first floor, while the Reference Room was on the ground 
floor in a different part of the building. Hammond testified on the convoluted 
layout of the office in 1858:
The divisions are scattered all over the office; three of my political divi-
sions out of four are in the second storey; and if I want to speak to one of 
the clerks, I must either bring him down to me, or if I want myself to refer 
to a paper or the register in the department, I must go up myself.58
Hammond saw the new building as an opportunity to aid the circulation of 
bodies within the building via the production of an idealized hierarchical 
space of communication:
All our clerks should be together; that is to say, every division should be 
complete in itself. The senior clerk should have one room for himself and 
one or two other clerks, and the juniors should be in a room going out of 
it, and those rooms should be as much as possible in direct communica-
tion with the Under-Secretary of State immediately superintending the 
division to which that senior clerk belongs.59
Hammond’s ideal office is a sprawling horizontal space. Later, when he is asked 
to testify about the number of floors he desires, he struggles to articulate what 
he would put on the two floors not described in the above quote. He grudgingly 
puts the slave trade department and the passport office in the basement and 
the translator and treaty department in the attic; the political staff ought to all 
57    See Fraser MacDonald, ‘Geopolitics and “the Vision Thing”: Regarding Britain and 
America’s First Nuclear Missile’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 31, 
no. 1 (2006), pp. 53-71.
58    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 2.
59    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 4.
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be located on the same floor, and thus be easily accessible. His mental hier-
archy of Foreign Office core functions is transmuted into his idealized space.
The committee also became wrapped up in what has been referred to else-
where as a knowledge controversy, or a decision to be made ‘in the face of per-
sisting disagreement between experts about what the problems are, and how 
they should be addressed’.60 At issue was how to guarantee the presence of 
light and fresh air throughout the new building to produce an affective atmo-
sphere of efficiency.61 Hammond makes this clear to the committee (‘The great 
object in a public office, as far as the interior is concerned, is to have as much 
external air and as much external light as possible’),62 and the committee tac-
itly accepts it as true. This is interesting, as Hammond is specifying that public 
offices have greater requirements for this than private residences. While his 
argument is couched generally with regard to public offices, it is nevertheless 
rooted in the specific experience of the Foreign Office: the old Foreign Office 
was materially failing because it had been designed to serve as private houses. 
In this case and in the above (governing bodies), an efficient atmosphere is the 
desired effect of spatial design. 
Hammond stated both his desire for large, open windows to allow in light 
and fresh air, as well as an aversion to courtyards, which he said amplified 
the sound of carriages turning around and also prevented truly fresh air from 
entering. While every architect disputed his claim about courtyards, a par-
ticularly divisive knowledge controversy erupted over whether a Gothic or 
Italianate style was better for the circulation of light and air. Both Henry Coe 
and Charles Barry, winners of the first and second prizes for the Foreign Office 
design (respectively), used Italianate design, and argued that Gothic mullions 
(vertical elements in a window separating panes of glass) limited the light and 
air entering the building. Barry couched his aversion to the Gothic style for 
public buildings as more than just his opinion, but as ‘the frequently expressed 
opinion of gentlemen with whom I have necessarily come into contact in this 
very building in which we sit [Parliament], when I was acting for my father [Sir 
Charles Barry, architect of the Gothic Houses of Parliament]’.63 
60    Barry, Material Politics, p. 8.
61    See Felix Driver, ‘Moral Geographies and the Urban Environment in Mid-nineteenth 
Century England’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988), 
pp. 275-287.
62    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 4.
63    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 58.
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George Gilbert Scott, the third prize winner (and eventual architect), 
staunchly defended the Gothic style (he would, after winning, be forced by 
Palmerston to switch to Italianate). His argument was that windows could be 
widened to allow for mullions and still admit light and air. Indeed, he presented 
statistics on window size for various buildings around London to illustrate the 
unfounded prejudice against the Gothic style. He further argued that: ‘As to the 
windows, the capability of window light in the Gothic considerably exceeds 
the capability in Italian architecture. I may mention that if it had not been so, 
it would have involved a great absurdity in the conduct of our forefathers here, 
and their contemporary architects in Italy’.64
Scott detailed technological inventions that enabled Gothic windows to 
ventilate just as well as Italian ones. He then sealed his argument with a patri-
otic reference to the indigenous nature of the Gothic vis-à-vis the Italian style. 
In doing so, he effectively coded the material elements of the Foreign Office 
apparatus with nationalism, a coding that resonates because of the specific 
functions accorded to the Foreign Office building.
The final report from the select committee specifically set aside the issue of 
style. The committee decided that the style did not significantly impact upon 
the price of the building, the presence of light and air, or even neighbourhood 
coherence (as the site was between the Gothic Houses of Parliament and the 
Italianate Horse Guards Parade). This knowledge controversy, contested as it 
was by the leading architects in the land, was ultimately decided to be irrel-
evant to the state’s interest in the affective atmospheres fostered in the new 
Foreign Office.
 Conclusions
The fall and rise of the material infrastructure of the Foreign Office could be 
understood as a banal story of engineering, architecture and the public sec-
tor. However, this article shows how the historical record indicates the role of 
the non-human in the world of diplomacy. The slow-motion collapse of the 
old Foreign Office resulted from resonating materialities (soil, paper and print-
ing press) intersecting over a range of temporalities (the vestigial engineering 
of sewers and private houses, the proliferation of states and the acceleration 
of diplomatic communication). Furthermore, the Foreign Office adopted a 
new configuration with the influx of finance and expertise that was offered by 
64    Report from the Select Committee on Foreign Office Reconstruction; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, p. 65.
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central government, reterritorializing the Office as a foreign policy actor dis-
tinct from other parts of the British ‘external’ project of governmentality, such 
as the Colonial Office and the War Office (even sharing books was deemed 
impossible). This event was an opportunity to ‘mineralize’ resources into a 
form that maximized governmental efficiency and ‘future-proofed’ the Foreign 
Office through practices of spatial design. This provoked knowledge controver-
sies, around which material forms enabled the right circulations and prevented 
the wrong ones, with Parliamentary debate hinging on baroque technolo-
gies such as window sashes. The fact that no decision was made between 
Gothic and Italianate is less important than that the introduction of light 
and air to generate atmospheres of governmental efficiency was universally 
deemed crucial.
This story has implications for how scholars consider both governmentality 
and diplomacy. First, scholars of governmentality have often focused on 
archives as a key instrument of state power. Typically the archive is considered 
in an abstract, dematerialized way, and as such it is difficult to discern its agency. 
However, in this case the weight and mode of reproducing the archive came to 
matter greatly. The archive’s materiality was demonstrated as being capable of 
affecting both the state apparatus in which the archive was sustained and the 
wider dispositif of the geopolitical order in ways that were both unpredictable 
and specific. In this case, the additional space that was provided for paper in 
the new building was still not enough, and was also productive of new lines of 
flight. For instance, the recent revelation of one million unacknowledged files 
from the colonial era in a secret illegal archive in Hanslope Park indicates that 
the proliferation of paper in the Foreign Office reached epic proportions even 
after the Foreign and Commonwealth Office took over George Gilbert Scott’s 
entire creation.65 The fifteen miles of floor-to-ceiling bookshelves could not 
have been accommodated in any of the architects’ proposals. Yet the enlarged 
Foreign Office, with the reduction of paper in a digitizing workplace, enabled 
the bureaucracy to expand materially in other ways, most notably in terms of 
staff (currently roughly 4,500 civil servants). The shift to digital archives — as 
part of the FCO’s ‘Digital Transformation’ — offers a new material milieu in 
need of investigation.
65    Ian Cobain, ‘Foreign Office Hoarding 1m Historic Files in Secret Archive’, The Guardian 
(18 October 2013), available online at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/18/
foreign-office-historic-files-secret-archive (last accessed 2 April 2015).
 103Assembling the British Foreign Office
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (2016) 78-104
For diplomatic studies, a consideration of diplomatic practices as contrib-
uting to international society is not new.66 Indeed, Costas Constantinou’s 
reminder that diplomats can serve as a connective tissue — a mid-space — 
reflects a profoundly humanistic vision of what the profession of diplomacy 
can be.67 In focusing on people to the exclusion of things, materials and their 
relations, such a vision can eliminate from view the paper, wires, cables, gifts, 
and so on, that serve as the material infrastructure of diplomacy. More-than-
human diplomatic studies could highlight these elements. Some might see this 
as watering down the responsibility of diplomats to produce solutions. Rather, 
it is a recognition that human intentions are not enough to produce political 
change; instead, diplomats must become attuned to the dynamics of the dip-
lomatic system and discern where and when their efforts are likely to make a 
difference. Connolly refers to those with this skill as seers:
[A] seer does not only express premonitions about an uncertain future at 
protean moments. Those same skills and sensitivities are also indispens-
able to the formation of new maxims, judgments, concepts, and strate-
gies at untimely moments when a collection of old precepts, habits, and 
standards of judgment are insufficient to an emerging situation.68
A more-than-human diplomacy is therefore not one that abdicates responsi-
bility; rather, it is one that recognizes the dynamic flow of power within assem-
blages and sees its responsibility as finding the ‘maxims, judgments, concepts, 
and strategies’ that are appropriate for humanity’s emerging problems.
This research also illustrates a problem for scholars of assemblage. Theorists 
of assemblage have at times struggled to articulate power relations within spe-
cific assemblages, because of the fundamentally open-ended and relational 
ontology of assemblage. The emergent agency of the diplomatico–military 
dispositif can be seen acting on the Foreign Office’s bodies and buildings 
through the increasingly intense influx of paper and its complex relations 
with the old Foreign Office. However, the new building’s immense capacity to 
hold paper enables it today to be filled with bodies, producing new capabili-
ties in the specialist, networked diplomacy that the FCO is pioneering today. 
This calls into question the temporalities of power: to identify power at any 
moment is also to identify a particular duration for that power. However, the 
66    Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2002).
67    Constantinou, ‘Between Statecraft and Humanism’.
68    William Connolly, A World of Becoming (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 164.
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open-ended  spatialities of assemblage are also open-ended temporalities. The 
desire of scholars to identify powerful elements narrows the temporalities of 
that assemblage in ways that limit our sense of assemblage theory’s potential. 
Future research should remain open to a range of political temporalities in 
order to imagine a more-than-human politics.
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